Chicago Unbound
metadata only
Value Maximization in Financial Contracts
This essay, adapted from the 2026 Coase Lecture, at the University of Chicago, considers the extent to which financial contracts are calibrated to maximize parties' expected joint surplus. Because capital market transactions link typically well-counseled parties who put substantial value at risk, an
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Fair Value of Liabilities: The Financial Economics Perspective#252919
- Stock Grants as a Committment Device#942204
- Prevention and promotion approaches to contracting: Implications for negotiator focus and contract frames on exchange performance and relationships in the digital age#675918
- Auctions with Contract Design#1118652
- Multi-year contracts between Dutch hospitals and health insurers: Exploring contract function and frame.#1081471
Record · ID 1124143
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive