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Two Margins of Climate Cooperation: Emissions and Coalition Membership under Tipping
We study climate coalition stability with endogenous temperature and stochastic tipping. In our dynamic game, rising temperature widens the emissions gap between members and nonmembers, shrinking stable coalitions over time. The threat of tipping strengthens free-riding, raising emissions and reduci
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