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Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of WTO Judicial Delegation on U.S. Trade Politics
This article argues that the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization has engaged in substantial lawmaking since its inception and that, in many circumstances, decisions rendered by court-like bodies in the WTO are adhered to even when the same policy would not gain support in multilateral neg
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