Goodness and Moral Obligation

This essay argues for the priority of objective deontic obligations to subjective deontic obligations. I provide an example of a fundamental objective deontic principle, and argue that the content of the principle is that one ought to prescind from effecting disvalue in other individuals. The explanation of the goodness of the principle consists in beneficence i.e. that it protects the welfare and capacities of all individuals, in a manner which is neutral to their personal identities. I argue, then, that the property of goodness at issue is intrinsic, and that the intrinsic goodness of the objective deontic modality motivates two methods for acting in accord with it. Finally, I provide a defense of the claim that our knowledge of the validity of ethical obligations consists both in ethical intuition -- for which I provide rigorous foundations by defining intuition-that as a modal logical operator -- and in its satisfaction of abductive criteria on theory choice.