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The Philosophical Contribution of the Preservationism vs. Generativism Debate and the Epistemic Roles of Memory
This article defends the thesis that the primary philosophical contribution to the cognitive science of memory, especially through the epistemological debate between preservationism and generativism/simulationism, lies in unveiling memory’s epistemic multifunctionality. Instead of resolving which view is correct, philosophy demonstrates that memory serves diverse "epistemic games"—such as the faithful recording of the past, adaptive simulation for the future, and the construction of identity. By articulating this functional plurality, philosophy redefines problems for scientific investigation, critiques reductionist models that ignore this complexity, and suggests future studies focused on how different mnemonic mechanisms serve distinct objectives of knowledge and action. Thus, philosophy acts as a conceptual compass, fostering a richer and more nuanced understanding of memory, guiding science beyond simplistic dichotomies toward the functional complexity of mnemonic processes. This approach highlights philosophy's role in enriching the empirical agenda, ensuring that scientific investigation is informed by the multiple ways memory undergirds our epistemic lives.
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