When the future is open: on God's knowledge and credences in future contingents

This paper aims to discuss the problem of divine omniscience and human free will. The problem states that if God is omniscient and knows what every human will do in any given situation, does that not imply that humans do not have free will? If God, for instance, knows that Diana will do P next Tuesday, but Diana refrains from doing P next Tuesday, then Diana will bring about that God did not know that Diana will refrain from doing P next Tuesday and hence, God is not omniscient. But if God is omniscient, Diana cannot refrain from doing P next Tuesday, but if she cannot, then does that not mean that she does not have free will? In this paper, I discuss how open theism, a modern view of God, solves the conflict between divine omniscience and human free will. I also argue that if open theism is correct and the future is open, then God has credences in propositions about the future, which addresses some challenges that open theism usually faces.