Disability as a Theme in Phenomenology

There are two ways to tell the story of disability in the phenomenological tradition. On the first, disability has always been a theme, albeit often described using related terms such as impairment, illness, pathology, abnormality, or bodily variation. It has always been so in part because embodiment and its relationship to the social world regularly appear as a theme in the work of many central figures and across multiple debates in the tradition. On the second way of telling the story, phenomenological analysis of disability is relatively new, kicked off by the work of S. Kay Toombs in the early 1990s. Phenomenologists historically ignored disability as a fundamental aspect of being human because they either ignored disabled people’s testimony concerning their experiences or because they understood the description, reconstruction, and resulting knowledge of variations of norms, normality, and the normate, however defined, as mere stepping stones on the way to understanding the general (normal) structures of lived experience. Instead of picking one way of telling the story over the other, I will thread the needle between these ways of framing the complex relationship between the phenomenological tradition and inquiry into disability, for each harbors important insights.