Ineffective Rule of Law by Informal Rules, Norms and Networks: The Role of Political Parties in Hindering Democratization in Western Balkan Countries

The aim of this paper is to examine the role played by political parties in the penetration/maintenance of informal rules, norms, and networks within state structures, rendering the operation of the rule of law ineffective and undermining democratization processes. Here, we argue that the malfunction of the rule of law from persistent phenomena such as the dominance of informal institutions/rules, state capture, political clientelism, and patronage networks by political parties in Western Balkans countries has made their democratic institutions, or what Guillermo O’Donnell (1996) calls the “full institutional package” of polyarchy, to function with serious deficits. By conceiving the rule of law as a crucial dimension of the democratic system, and by maintaining that democratic rights and freedoms are effectively ensured only to the extent that state institutions/structures are bound by the rule of law, we here advance the argument that political parties have managed to exploit the structural weakness of the state in their environments to subjugate them for partisan gain and advantages. The cases from the Western Balkan countries considered in this study are Albania, Serbia, and North Macedonia. Keywords: Rule of Law, Democratization, State institutions, Informal rules/networks, Particularism, Clientelism, Patronage, Western Balkan countries.