arXiv (All)
open access
Delegated Information Provision
A designer relies on an experimenter to provide information to a decision maker. The experimenter has incentives to persuade rather than merely transmit information. Anticipating this motive, the designer can restrict the set of admissible experiments, but cannot prevent the experimenter from garbli
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- The Heart Of Conciousness: Determinism, Exposure, and the Conditions of Free Will in a Shared World#103330
- Inferences and the Right to Privacy#79303
- Regulatory and legal framework of information and data security#394068
- 13. Data Protection Without Data : Informationless Chilling Effects and Data Protection Law#1176762
- Acquiring irrelevant information as a commitment#620470
Record · ID 1141245
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive