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Information Games: Strategic Crowding and Firm Repositioning in Language-Model Space
Firms follow changing economic opportunities, but rivalry changes their response. We develop ESCAPE, a rational-share game of distribution-valued positioning with heterogeneous capability costs, establish a unique equilibrium, and derive an exact reallocation restriction separating opportunity and c
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