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Unbeatable imitation of a friend
Imitation sometimes achieves success in multi-agent situations even though it is very simple. In repeated games, success of imitation has been characterized by unbeatability against other agents. Previous studies specified conditions under which imitation is unbeatable against co-players in repeated
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