Risk Is Not a Property of the Person: A Structural Model of Parole

This paper argues that the moral boundary relevant to parole decisions lies not at the level of behavior but at the level of orientation: the stable, underlying structure that governs how an agent interprets constraints, evaluates options, and directs action. Contemporary parole systems implicitly treat behavior as a reliable proxy for moral change, yet behavior is often shaped more by external conditions than by internal transformation. I develop a structural account of agency that distinguishes outward compliance from genuine re‑orientation, showing why the former can be produced by coercive environments while the latter reflects a shift in the agent’s evaluative stance. Using this framework, I analyze the epistemic and ethical failures built into behavior‑based assessments and propose an orientation‑level model that better captures moral responsibility, risk, and the conditions under which release is justified. The result is a principled, non‑punitive approach to parole that aligns institutional decision‑making with a more accurate understanding of human agency.