A Transcendental Investigation of Semantic Paradox

This paper proposes a reversal of the standard strategy for dealing with semantic paradox. Rather than beginning with paradoxical sentences and diagnosing what has gone wrong, it starts from a general account of linguistic pathology and asks which sentences instantiate it. I argue that interpretability is a necessary condition of communication, and that certain forms of semantic disorders—most notably permanent ambiguity and self-denial—constitute genuine pathologies of language. Central to study is a distinction between two roles played by truth: one that secures the link between language and world, and another that operates affirmatively within language itself. I argue that self-reference, often treated as a source of paradox, is better understood as a structural enabling condition, while the pathological effects arise from a specific internal use of truth. On this basis, I outline a principled strategy for containing semantic pathology and indicate how it can be formally implemented without sacrificing legitimate expressive resources.