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Daycare Matching with Siblings: Social Implementation and Welfare Evaluation
In centralized matching markets, agents may value joint assignment, as with siblings or couples. Standard preference estimation ignores such complementarities, complicating welfare analysis of priority rules for paired assignment. We develop an empirical framework incorporating these preferences and
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