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Robust Nash Alignment under Preference Uncertainty
Preference-based alignment methods typically optimize against a single preference model, and can therefore be brittle when pairwise preferences are uncertain: noisy, heterogeneous, or shift after deployment. To address these issues, we propose Robust Nash Alignment, a game-theoretic framework for al
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