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Social welfare and price discovery in double auction markets
The tendency of the double auction mechanism to drive prices to competitive equilibrium has been well documented in laboratory experiments, but the phenomenon has lacked a theoretical explanation. This paper studies dynamic double auctions in a pure exchange economy where agents bid their indifferen
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