PhilArchive
open access
From Mathematical Fictionalism to Truth-Theoretic Fictionalism
We argue that if Stephen Yablo (2005) is right that philosophers of mathematics ought to endorse a fictionalist view of number-talk, then there is a compelling reason for deflationists about truth to endorse a fictionalist view of truth-talk. More specifically, our claim will be that, for deflationists about truth, Yablo’s argument for mathematical fictionalism can be employed and mounted as an argument for truth-theoretic fictionalism.
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Against Sainsbury’s Irrealism About Fictional Characters: Harry Potter as an Abstract Artifact#779005
- Book Review Truth by Alexis G Burgess and John P Burgess#756226
- Is deflationism compatible with compositional and tarskian truth theories?#760551
- The Homeomorphism of Minkowski Space and the Separable Complex Hilbert Space: The physical, Mathematical and Philosophical Interpretations#759849
- Charles Peirce's Limit Concept of Truth#94088
Record · ID 117329
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive