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Linguistic Meaning, Rigid Designators, and Legal Philosophy
This essay is intended to engage some of the controversies that have emerged in legal philosophy concerning the theory of linguistic meaning we should adopt with reference to the law. In particular, I will focus on two theories of linguistic meaning that have opposing positions both on the nature of
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