The Problem of Universals in Yogic Perception and Tsong kha pa’s Solution

This paper explores Tsong kha pa’s (1357–1419), one of the most influential Tibetan Buddhist Philosophers in history, theory of universals. His theory is born out of a conundrum: Given his Buddhist commitments, he must maintain a certain nominalism, which contends that universals, by virtue of being conceptual, are mental projections and do not inhere in the world. At the same time, he must also explain how reasoning, which relies on universals, is epistemic. Tsong kha pa thus concludes that universals are, in fact, not completely the product of mere conceptual concoction. Neither, however, does Tsong kha pa argue a robust realism for universals in a manner that abandons Buddhism’s larger anti-realist agenda. Affording universals a quasi-real status, Tsong kha pa is able to save them from being vitiated alongside conceptual superimposition. Furthermore, this position allows Tsong kha pa to conclude that certain universals are the object of nonconceptual yogic perception, which by definition sees the world as it really exists. This move fits squarely with Tsong kha pa and his Dge lugs school’s wider realist ontological project.