Was verlangt die Perspektivität vom Erkennen? Zum Umgang mit endlichen Horizonten

This paper asks what it would mean for epistemic practices to take irreducible perspectivity into account. It starts with the premise that such perspectivity cannot be explained on the basis of conceptual logic alone, but only by virtue of the logic of sensual perception. Following Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, four requirements are developed that irreducible perspectivity demands from epistemic practice: interminable movement, broadening horizons, bearing disharmonies and the presupposition of different horizons. As soon as truth-oriented practice is detached from the traditional idea of final insights into ›things themselves‹, as it survives in the concepts of epistemology, it emerges as a concrete, mundane endeavour that continuously has to deal with the possibility that the world might be understood better, deeper or differently.