Ontological Understanding of Truth, Perspective, and Morality in Nietzsche the Anti-Relativist

Nietzsche has a word to say in most of the areas of philosophy. In ontology, there is the idea of becoming, in epistemology he talks about perspectivism and truth, and his ethics has the morality of the Overman. However, although enough has been said about Nietzsche’s philosophy in general, not much emphasis has been given to how his views about perspectivism, morality, and truth relate to the ontology of becoming. The aim of this paper is to shed light on this important connection. Accordingly, first, the paper examines his ontology of becoming and contrasts it with the Parmenidean ontology of being. Later, the paper follows Nietzsche’s footsteps in deconstructing the commonsense understanding of Truth and shows how he reconfigures the truths with his perspectivism in connection with the ontology of becoming. Towards the end, it presents Nietzsche’s criticism of morality as being-in-itself that—the paper argues—follows the Parmenidean ontology of being. Finally, by emphasizing the order of value differences in some valuations, meanings, truths, and focusing on Nietzsche’s denial of nihilism, the paper argues against the claim of Nietzsche being a moral relativist.