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Confirmation Bias as Rational Mistrust
When learning from others, people tend to focus their attention on those with similar views. This is often attributed to flawed reasoning, and thought to slow learning and polarize beliefs. However, we show that this confirmatory bias is a rational response to uncertainty about the accuracy of infor
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