arXiv (All)
open access
Proxy Confidence: Auditing Black-Box LLM Agents with a Surrogate's Log-Probabilities
A deployed LLM agent emits tool calls, queries, and code that can be silently wrong -- by the time the error surfaces, the action has run. Frontier chat APIs hide the model's token probabilities; the agent's stated confidence barely beats chance on the mistakes that matter; and resampling does not h
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- LLMail-Inject: A Dataset from a Realistic Adaptive Prompt Injection Challenge#1297997
- AgentSecBench: Measuring Prompt Injection, Privacy Leakage, and Tool-Use Integrity in LLM Agents#229449
- Towards a Unified Misuse Monitoring Benchmark#1216464
- Quantifying Overclaiming Propensity in Frontier LLM Agents#978407
- Agents' Overreliance on Unreliable Tools#1257982
Record · ID 1199168
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive