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Can CaMeLs Talk? Securing Multi-Agent Systems Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks
Indirect prompt injection attacks - malicious instructions embedded in content processed by large language models - remain a major obstacle to safely deploying tool-using agents. CaMeL [Debenedetti et al., 2025] mitigates this threat for an individual agent by separating trusted control flow from un
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