HAL (France)
open access
How can inflation contracts discipline central bankers when agents are learning?
This paper studies, in a new Keynesian model with a positive optimal output gap, how to design linear inflation contracts to shape the central bank's incentive structure when private expectations are based on adaptive learning. In this model, under rational expectations, inflation contracts could on
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