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Asymmetric Information in Wage Contracts: Experimental Evidence and Welfare Implications
Compared to self-employment or performance-based pay, fixed wages reduce earnings uncertainty but are prone to market distortions through moral hazard and adverse selection. Using a model of wage contracts under asymmetric information, I show that these distortions map to marginal treatment response
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