On the notion of diachronic emergence

Is there a need for a distinctively diachronic conception of metaphysical emergence? This chapter argues to the contrary. In the main, its argumentative strategy consists in considering a representative sample of accounts of purportedly diachronic metaphysical emergence, and arguing that in each case, the purportedly diachronic emergence at issue either can (and should) be subsumed under a broadly synchronic account of metaphysical emergence, or else is better seen as simply a case of causation. More specifically, it is argued that emergence as a diachronic causal phenomenon can be synchronically accommodated as involving emergent powers of a composite to produce the effects in question; that dynamic emergence can be synchronically accommodated as involving cotemporal dependence on a temporally extended base; that fusion/transformational emergence is plausibly just causation, subject to conditions standardly satisfied in cases of intra-level causation; and that ‘contextual’ emergence is plausibly just causation, where (as per usual) causes (or associated powers or dispositions) enter into producing effects only given the obtaining of relevant background conditions.