The Performative Contradiction of Hume: The Causal Necessity of Thought and the Logic of Self-Refutation

This paper provides a critical re-examination of David Hume’s skepticism regarding causality, identifying a fundamental performative contradiction inherent in his argumentation. Hume reduces causality to a psychological expectation rooted in habit, asserting that there is no logical necessity behind the constant conjunction of events. However, this study argues that Hume’s position is self-refuting on two decisive grounds. First, the very concept of 'habit formation' that Hume employs as a premise is itself a causal process; thus, his argument relies on the very causal necessity it seeks to deny. Second, the denial of causality extends to the causal generation of thought, rendering all philosophical reasoning—including Hume's own—a mere product of chance, thereby evaporating its logical validity. By demonstrating that the act of asserting the contingency of all causality necessitates a causal structure of thought, this paper concludes that Hume’s theory is self-destructively invalidated at the moment of its assertion.