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A Regulator's Career Option: Revolving Doors, Regulatory Signals, and Firm Tail Risk
This paper develops a revolving-door model in which a regulator designs policy signals that affect a regulated firm's capital structure while holding an implicit career option to leave public service for the regulated firm or its advisers. The model has three linked mechanisms. First, regulatory sig
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