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AgentTracer: Tracing Indirect Prompt Injection Attack through Fine-Grained Intention-Execution Alignment
Large language model (LLM) agents interact with external resources to complete complex user tasks, exposing them to indirect prompt injection (IPI), where malicious instructions redirect agents toward attacker-intended tasks. Since IPI is difficult to defend against in real-world environments, post-
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