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Dictatorial profiles: a proof of Arrow's theorem
We study social welfare rules with strict individual and social preferences. A preference profile is dictatorial for a rule if the social preference coincides with some agent's preference and no agent with a different preference can change the social preference unilaterally. We establish that (i) a
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