Heidegger’s Concept of Truth: The Phenomenological Core of the Ontological Turn

Despite Heidegger’s efforts to distance himself from Husserl’s phenomenology, the extent of his success in Being and Time is not immediately evident. Attentive readers not only recognize passages and concepts borrowed from the Logical Investigations but also notice the conspicuous absence of Husserl’s name in connection with them. This article demonstrates the pervasive yet hidden influence of the Logical Investigations in §44 of Being and Time. I argue that the truncated pronouncements on truth in §44 (a) and (b) find their methodological and systematic framework from Husserl’s Fifth and Sixth Logical Investigations. At the same time, Husserl’s phenomenology is ontologically limited, prompting Heidegger’s return to Aristotle and his unconventional reading of Metaphysics Θ.