EconStor
metadata only
De facto voting power and the value of voting rights
We document high persistence in shareholder turnout, creating predictable differences in effective voting power across firms. Accordingly, firms with lower turnout exhibit higher voting premia. For identification, we exploit the 2010 NYSE Rule 452 amendment eliminating broker authority over uninstru
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Stock market volatiltity around national elections#499621
- Capitol Gains: The Returns to Elected Office from Corporate Board Directorships#333816
- Measuring dynamic connectedness with large Bayesian VAR models#954995
- Congressional Stock Trading: Trade-Date Returns of Congress Members and Market Reactions to Public Disclosures#305971
- Political Risk and Stock Returns: The Case of Hong Kong#942677
Record · ID 1249907
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive