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Reciprocity in the shadow of Threat
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents evaluate differently a contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The sec
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