Munich Personal RePEc Archive
metadata only
Why should central banks be independent?
Most explanations for the necessity of an independent central bank rely on the time-inconsistency model and therefore assume that governments are weak, foolish, or untruthful and tend to cheat people. The model in this paper indicates, however, that an independent central bank is not necessary becau
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- The Macroeconomic Consequences of Undermining Central Bank Independence: Evidence from Governor Transitions#130824
- Distributive Justice, Political Legitimacy, and Independent Central Banks#73166
- Central banking and inequalities: old tropes and new practices#73171
- Foreign exchange intervention and central bank independence: The Latin American experience#1276243
- The Impact of Foreign Banks on Market Concentration: The Case of India#403824
Record · ID 1274688
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive