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Sustaining cooperation in trust games

Rigdon, Mary et al.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive · Reports
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designformationoperations
It is well-known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner's Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Without knowing it, players are typed
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