Munich Personal RePEc Archive
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Moral hazard in a voluntary deposit insurance system: Revisited
This paper extends Wheelock and Kumbhakar’s (1995) test for moral hazard in the Kansas deposit insurance system (1910-1920). This paper tests and finds evidence of omitted bank-specific effects. Estimates in Wheelock and Kumbhakar (1995), as a result, are biased. This paper introduces unobserved
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