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Interaction between Vertical and Horizontal tax Competition: Theory and Evidence
We develop a model with two provinces, producing two goods: one mobile and the other not. The mobile good is taxed according to the destination principle by the local government; it is also federally taxed. People decide to buy the good at the most advantageous price. Namely they can buy bootlegged
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