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A corrigendum to "Games with imperfectly observable actions in continuous time"
Sannikov (2007) investigates properties of perfect public equilibria in continuous time repeated games. This note points out that the proof of the main theorem (Theorem 2) needs some corrections. I show that the main theorem holds as it is with suitable modifications of Lemmata 5 and 6.
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