Munich Personal RePEc Archive
metadata only
Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access
There is substantial evidence that political contributions buy access to politicians. This paper incorporates access into a model of informational lobbying, then uses the access framework to analyze the impact of contribution limits on policy outcomes and representative citizen welfare. In the compe
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access#1274691
- Public Policy Limits on Tax Benefits: Bob Jones Revisited#941853
- Privacy, Autonomy, and the Dissolution of Markets#92234
- Quo Vadis, Digital Accessibility? A Prerequisite for Democratic Equality#1002180
- Quo Vadis, Digital Accessibility? A Prerequisite for Democratic Equality#977350
Record · ID 1276586
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive