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Tie-Breaking Rules and Divisibility in Experimental Duopoly Markets
We investigate pricing behavior of sellers in duopoly markets with posted prices and market power. The two treatment variables are given by tie-breaking rules and divisibility of the price space. The first treatment variable deals with the rule under which demanded units are allocated between seller
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