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An auction mechanism for public goods provision: an experimental study
We experiment a new mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good: in a fixed period individuals can contribute several times; at any moment they can see the total amount collected; at the end of the period, the public good is provided if the amount covers the cost. We find that the ability
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