Munich Personal RePEc Archive
metadata only
Deterrence, Preemption and Panic: A Common-Enemy Problem of Terrorism
We develop a game-theoretic analysis of terrorism that examines the interaction between a terrorist organization and multiple target countries, and considers both pre-emption and deterrence as counter-terrorist policies. The damage from terror includes not only the material cost of fatality, injury
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Towards a resolution of terrorism using game theory coalitions, negotiations and audience costs#648879
- Unconditional vs. Conditional Critics of Terrorist Violence: A Seemingly Endless Debate#90432
- ITERATE International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events#474559
- Battlefield dynamics and the timing and location of terrorism in civil conflicts#293015
- The Grotius Sanction: Deus Ex Machina. The legal, ethical, and strategic use of drones in transnational armed conflict and counterterrorism#87308
Record · ID 1277915
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive