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The institutional Design of international double Taxation Avoidance
This article analyzes the institutional design of international double tax avoidance. The basic argument is that double tax avoidance exhibits the strategic structure of a coordination game with a distributive conflict. The distribution of tax revenues depends on the asymmetry of investment flows be
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