Similarity of Information and Collective Action

[2407.14773] Similarity of Information and Collective Action Skip to main content Search Submit Donate Log in Search arXiv Press Enter to search · Advanced search Economics > General Economics arXiv:2407.14773 (econ) [Submitted on 20 Jul 2024 ( v1 ), last revised 23 Jul 2024 (this version, v2)] Title: Similarity of Information and Collective Action Authors: Deepal Basak , Joyee Deb , Aditya Kuvalekar View a PDF of the paper titled Similarity of Information and Collective Action, by Deepal Basak and 2 other authors View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract: We study a canonical collective action game with incomplete information. Individuals attempt to coordinate to achieve a shared goal, while also facing a temptation to free-ride. Consuming more similar information about the fundamentals can help them coordinate, but it can also exacerbate free-riding. Our main result shows that more similar information facilitates (impedes) achieving a common goal when achieving the goal is sufficiently challenging (easy). We apply this insight to show why insufficiently powerful authoritarian governments may face larger protests when attempting to restrict press freedom, and why informational diversity in committees is beneficial when each vote carries more weight. Subjects: General Economics (econ.GN) Cite as: arXiv:2407.14773 [econ.GN] (or arXiv:2407.14773v2 [econ.GN] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2407.14773 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Related DOI : https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20241056 Focus to learn more DOI(s) linking to related resources Submission history From: Aditya Kuvalekar [ view email ] [v1] Sat, 20 Jul 2024 06:36:12 UTC (70 KB) [v2] Tue, 23 Jul 2024 01:04:54 UTC (70 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: View a PDF of the paper titled Similarity of Information and Collective Action, by Deepal Basak and 2 other authors View PDF HTML (experimental) TeX Source view license Current browse context: econ.GN < prev | next > new | recent | 2024-07 Change to browse by: econ q-fin q-fin.EC References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar export BibTeX citation Loading... BibTeX formatted citation × loading... Data provided by: Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer ( What is the Explorer? ) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers ( What is Connected Papers? ) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps ( What is Litmaps? ) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations ( What are Smart Citations? ) Code, Data, Media Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv Toggle alphaXiv ( What is alphaXiv? ) Links to Code Toggle CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers ( What is CatalyzeX? ) DagsHub Toggle DagsHub ( What is DagsHub? ) GotitPub Toggle Gotit.pub ( What is GotitPub? ) Huggingface Toggle Hugging Face ( What is Huggingface? ) ScienceCast Toggle ScienceCast ( What is ScienceCast? ) Demos Demos Replicate Toggle Replicate ( What is Replicate? ) Spaces Toggle Hugging Face Spaces ( What is Spaces? ) Spaces Toggle TXYZ.AI ( What is TXYZ.AI? ) Related Papers Recommenders and Search Tools Link to Influence Flower Influence Flower ( What are Influence Flowers? ) Core recommender toggle CORE Recommender ( What is CORE? ) Author Venue Institution Topic About arXivLabs arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs . Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax ( What is MathJax? ) We gratefully acknowledge support from our major funders , member institutions , , and all contributors. About · Help · Contact · Subscribe · Copyright · Privacy · Accessibility · Operational Status (opens in new tab) Major funding support from

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