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Adaptive Incentive Design for Linear-Quadratic Dynamic Games: No-Regret Social Coordination
Incentives can align private interests with collective goals, but their design becomes intertwined with learning when agents' preferences are unknown. This paper develops an adaptive incentive-design framework for multi-agent linear-quadratic dynamic games, where a system planner can simultaneously
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