Coalitions in Repeated Games

[1906.00280] Coalitions in Repeated Games Skip to main content Search Submit Donate Log in Search arXiv Press Enter to search · Advanced search Economics > Theoretical Economics arXiv:1906.00280 (econ) [Submitted on 1 Jun 2019 ( v1 ), last revised 10 Apr 2026 (this version, v4)] Title: Coalitions in Repeated Games Authors: S. Nageeb Ali , Ce Liu View a PDF of the paper titled Coalitions in Repeated Games, by S. Nageeb Ali and Ce Liu View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract: This paper proposes a framework and solution concept for repeated coalitional behavior. We model history-dependent schemes that deter coalitions from blocking using continuation promises and punishments. We evaluate the effectiveness of these schemes across a range of settings, and apply our results to repeated matching and negotiations. Subjects: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) Cite as: arXiv:1906.00280 [econ.TH] (or arXiv:1906.00280v4 [econ.TH] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1906.00280 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Submission history From: Ce Liu [ view email ] [v1] Sat, 1 Jun 2019 19:57:09 UTC (595 KB) [v2] Fri, 31 Jan 2020 05:31:56 UTC (937 KB) [v3] Thu, 20 Feb 2025 01:19:09 UTC (438 KB) [v4] Fri, 10 Apr 2026 04:12:45 UTC (460 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: View a PDF of the paper titled Coalitions in Repeated Games, by S. Nageeb Ali and Ce Liu View PDF HTML (experimental) TeX Source view license Current browse context: econ.TH < prev | next > new | recent | 2019-06 Change to browse by: econ References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar export BibTeX citation Loading... BibTeX formatted citation × loading... Data provided by: Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer ( What is the Explorer? ) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers ( What is Connected Papers? ) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps ( What is Litmaps? ) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations ( What are Smart Citations? ) Code, Data, Media Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv Toggle alphaXiv ( What is alphaXiv? ) Links to Code Toggle CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers ( What is CatalyzeX? ) DagsHub Toggle DagsHub ( What is DagsHub? ) GotitPub Toggle Gotit.pub ( What is GotitPub? ) Huggingface Toggle Hugging Face ( What is Huggingface? ) ScienceCast Toggle ScienceCast ( What is ScienceCast? ) Demos Demos Replicate Toggle Replicate ( What is Replicate? ) Spaces Toggle Hugging Face Spaces ( What is Spaces? ) Spaces Toggle TXYZ.AI ( What is TXYZ.AI? ) Related Papers Recommenders and Search Tools Link to Influence Flower Influence Flower ( What are Influence Flowers? ) Core recommender toggle CORE Recommender ( What is CORE? ) Author Venue Institution Topic About arXivLabs arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs . Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax ( What is MathJax? ) We gratefully acknowledge support from our major funders , member institutions , , and all contributors. About · Help · Contact · Subscribe · Copyright · Privacy · Accessibility · Operational Status (opens in new tab) Major funding support from

Related documents

• Ramsey achievement games on graphs : algorithms and bounds#796468
• Republican Freedom, Popular Control, and Collective Action#741656
• Coalition Policy in Multiparty Governments: Whose Preferences Prevail#428015
• Political Redlining by Algorithm#635415
• Political Redlining by Algorithm#635107