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Designing Markets for Screening: Optimal Composition and the Geometry of Surplus
We characterize the structure of market compositions that generate Pareto efficient outcomes and the geometry of the surplus set in a screening model with type-dependent costs. Maximizing principal or total surplus concentrates the market at the highest type, with all surplus extracted. Agent-orient
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