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Causal Front-Door Adjustment for Robust Jailbreak Attacks on LLMs
Jailbreak attacks on safety-aligned LLMs are increasingly effective, yet attack success alone does not reveal whether compliance is driven by preserved task intent, suppressed safety signals, or attack-specific artifacts. We use Pearl's front-door adjustment to motivate separating task-relevant sema
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