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Designing Persuasive Experiments
Incentives in experimental design are often misaligned: experimenters design and finance experiments to seek regulatory approval, while regulators seek to maximize social welfare. This incentive misalignment is especially relevant for Bayesian and adaptive trial designs, which have gained substantia
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